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ABSTRACT: Energy systems are relatively attractive 
targets for terrorist attacks and should be adequately 
protected. The quantitative risk analysis (QRA), with the 
threat assessment as one of its standard components, is 
considered to be a promising methodological framework 
for optimizing such protection. 
This paper presents the results of the research which 
consisted of two parts. In the first part the statistical 
analysis of the terrorist attacks towards energy systems 
was performed. The input data were derived from the 
Global Terrorism Database (GTD). Within the analysis 
relative contributions of the attacks on energy systems to 
the total number of attacks were determined. Also, it was 
examined how those contributions are influenced by 
various factors related to the characteristics of the target, 
terrorist group and the environment in which the group 
operates. 
In the second part of the research the method for the 
quantitative threat assessment was developed. It is 
based on the results of the performed statistical analysis 
(i.e. on historical data) and on expert judgments. The 
method is applicable to the electricity, gas and oil  
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 sectors. The implementation of the Bayesian networks 
allows for taking the uncertainties into consideration, as 
well as for easy modifying and updating. 
KEYWORDS: threat assessment, terrorism, energy 




Stable energy supply is the vital factor for the functioning of 
modern societies. It is well known that energy systems are 
primarily constructed to provide the service with the 
competitive costs and not to be resilient to the terrorist 
attacks. The importance of energy systems on one side and 
the vulnerability on the other side makes them attractive 
targets which should be adequately protected[1][2]. As 
always, the resources are limited and it is not possible to 
protect every component of energy infrastructure all the 
time. In other words, the protection has to be optimized. 
Risk assessment and management models and methods 
appear to be suitable methodological framework for 
optimizing the protection of energy infrastructure from 
terrorist activities[3]. In general, such methods can be 
qualitative or quantitative. However, within the risk 
assessment and management community it is believed that 
only quantitative methods provide good basis for the 
decision making. In addition, the methods should be able to 
take into consideration the uncertainties of the input data 
and to clearly indicate how confident the analysts are about 
the results[4]. 
The terrorism risk is a function of three parameters: (1) 
threat, (2) vulnerability and (3) consequences[5]. It means 
that in order to estimate the terrorism risk one has to assess 
each of those parameters. This research was focused to the 
threat and threat assessment only. The threat can be 
defined as an individual or an organization having both the 
intent and capability to impose damage to a target. To 
assess the threat means to estimate the probability that a 
specific target is attacked in a specific way during a specific 
time period. 
The performed research demonstrates how terrorist threats 













































.. historical data (i.e. the data on terrorist attacks carried out in 
the past) and expert judgments. It consisted of two parts. In 
the first part of the research the statistical analysis of the 
terrorist attacks towards energy systems was performed. 
This part is described in Section 2. In the second part of the 
research, covered in Section 3, the method for the 
quantitative threat assessment was developed. 
Historical data analysis 
The historical data analysis was based on the records from 
the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)[6][7]. GTD, operated 
by the START consortium, is currently the most 
comprehensive unclassified database on terrorist events 
around the world. The data is gathered continuously since 
1970 and now the database contains information on more 
than 140.000 terrorist attacks. For each attack 45 to 120 
variables are recorded (date, location, target, weapons used, 
casualties, group or individual responsible …). 
The analysis was focused on the 15 years period starting 
with 1996 and ending with 2010. All the records from that 
period were examined in detail and the attacks towards 
energy infrastructure were identified. Based on the 
descriptions provided in the database, for each attack the 
energy sector and the exact component which was targeted 
have been determined. 
The results show that within the covered time period 36.836 
attacks were recorded altogether (931 - 4.776 attacks per 
year). The attacks were organized in 177 states by 973 
terrorist groups (Figure 1). During the same period 746 
attacks were aimed towards energy infrastructure (Figure 2). 
Those attacks were carried out in 44 states by 56 groups. 
The analysis revealed that energy systems are selected as 
target approx. ones in 50 attacks on average, which gives 
the contribution of 2 % (Figure 3, Figure 4). As for the 
subsystems, electrical energy targets are selected approx. 
ones in 100 attacks, while gas and oil targets are selected 
once in 200 attacks. The contributions for the mentioned 
subsystems amount to 0,94%, 0,48% and 0,61% 
respectively. 
The contributions reflect the attractiveness of particular 
subsystem as a target. There are at least three possible 
reasons why electrical energy targets are selected more 




































 infrastructure can be found almost everywhere, which is not 
the case with the gas and oil. Second, the attacks on 
electrical energy systems result with immediate effects on 
energy supply, which is again not the case with the gas and 
oil. Third, electrical power lines are easily accessible, while 





















































































































































Figure 3: Relative contributions of the terrorist attacks on 












































Figure 4: Relative contributions by subsectors and 
components 
It can be noticed that the contributions of energy systems, 
when averaged across the world, are quite stable (black line 
on Figure 3). The contributions are mostly in the range 
between 1,5 and 2,5% and there are no major trends. 
However, the values for various geographical regions differ 
significantly (Figure 5).For instance, energy infrastructure 
seems to be very attractive for the terrorists in South 


























































Figure 5: Relative contributions by geographical region 
It's been shown that the factors having the biggest influence 
on the attractiveness of energy systems as terrorist attack 
targets are (1) the ideology of the terrorist group, (2) the 
presence of armed conflict in the area where the terrorists 
operate and (3) the activity of the terrorist group. In order to 
analyze the influence of the ideology, terrorist groups were 
divided into left wing groups, nationalists-separatists, 
religious groups and right-wing groups. Figure 6 shows that 
energy systems, as symbols of capitalism, are most 
attractive for the left-wing groups. Such targets are also 
quite attractive to nationalists-separatists, probably as the 
symbols of the state authority. It seems that the religious 
groups prefer to select targets with more direct relation with 
the state, while the right wing groups do not find energy 
systems attractive at all.  
The attractiveness of energy systems is below the average 
in the areas where armed conflict is not present and above 
the average in the areas with permanent armed conflict 
(Figure 7). It is believed that when armed conflict is present 
terrorist groups tend to implement typical guerilla and 


























































































Figure 7: Relative contributions by presence of armed 
conflict 
As for the influence of the terrorist group activity, the results 
of the analysis indicate that energy systems are more 























































Number of organized attacks (1996-2010)  
Figure 8: Relative contributions by terrorist group activity 
Method description 
The proposed threat assessment method is based on the 
results of the historical data analysis. It allows for combining 
the data on terrorist attacks carried out in the past with 
expert judgments. The method is quantitative, capable of 
taking into consideration the uncertainties of the input data 
and expressing the confidence level of the results. It is 
designed to be used by energy systems' operators within the 
electrical, gas and oil sectors. 
The threat (i.e. the probability of attacking specific target in a 
specific way by the specific terrorist group) is calculated as a 
product of 5 factors in a way that the number of attacks the 
terrorist group organizes in the area of interest is multiplied 
by 4 conditional probabilities: 













































.. 𝑇𝑇 threat (/yr) 
i index of terrorist attack scenario 
j index of terrorist group  
k index of consequence type 
𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴 number of terrorist attacks in the area of interest (/yr) 
     
     
           
        
      
   
      
      
     
           
𝐴𝐴 attack on any target 
𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁 attack on energy sector 
𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸  attack on energy subsector of interest (electrical energy, gas, oil) 
𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴  attack on target (energy system) of interest 
𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 attack according to particular scenario  
The equation implies that specific energy system can be 
attacked in specific way by specific terrorist group only if this 
group (1) decides to organize an attack, (2) selects energy 
sector (i.e. energy infrastructure) among all potential targets, 
(3) selects energy subsector of interest, (4) selects energy 
system of interest and (5) selects particular attack scenario. 
The first 3 factors in the equation are determined by utilizing 
historical data, while the other 2 factors are determined by 
expert judgment. 
The first factor in Equation (1) (the number of the attacks 
organized per year) is estimated by analyzing how many 
attacks per year were organized in the past and by taking 
trends into consideration. The input to the equation is not 
single value but the probabilistic distribution of values, which 
allows to take the uncertainties into consideration. 
The second factor (the probability of selecting energy sector 
of interest) is approximated by the relative contribution of the 
attacks on energy sector towards all terrorist attacks (Figure 
3) and by applying the correction factors related to the 
ideology, presence of armed conflict and the activity of the 
terrorist group (Figures 6, 7 and 8). This factor, also 
expressed in the form of the probability distribution, is 






The third factor (the probability of selecting particular energy 
subsector) is approximated by the relative contribution of the 
attacks in the subsector of interest (electrical, oil or gas) 
towards total attacks in energy sector (Figure 4). 
𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁|𝐴𝐴)0   uncorrected probability of attack against energy sector 
𝑓𝑓𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 correction factor for terrorist group ideology 
𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  correction factor for terrorist group activity 
𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 correction factor for security environment 
   
   
     
     
   




































 The remaining 2 factors in the Equation (1) are much more 
target specific than the first 3 factors. Because of that, it is 
more appropriate to estimate them by expert judgment than 
by utilizing historical data. In order to determine the fourth 
factor in the formula (the probability of selecting energy 
system of interest) experts have to assess relative 
attractiveness of the analyzed energy system by comparing 
its characteristics with the characteristics of other systems in 
the subsector. Two "special cases" should be mentioned. 
First, if the energy system of interest is the only one in the 
subsector the probability of the selection equals 1. Second, if 
there are n identical energy systems within the sub sector, 
this factor amounts to1/n. Those "special cases", however, 
usually do not apply. 
In order to determine the last factor in the Equation (1) (the 
probability of selecting particular attack scenario), the 
experts have to compare the attractiveness of various 
scenarios. This is performed by constructing the so-called 
utility function for the terrorist group and by estimating the 









Although the equations for assessing threats are not too 
complicated, adequate tools have to be used for carrying out 
the calculations, since the majority of the inputs are 
probability distributions and not single values. The tools 
implemented in this case are the Bayesian nets. In addition 
to the capability for handling the uncertainties, Bayesian nets 
provide intuitive overview of the variables and their 




𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 = 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑗𝑗  
𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 = �𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 ,𝑘𝑘 ∙ 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 ,𝑘𝑘
𝑘𝑘
 
          
       
       
      
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝 perceived expected utility 
𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝  utility function 
𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝  perceived probability of success 
𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝  perceived magnitude of consequences 













































.. relationships and allow for easy data updating and model 
transformations. Figure 9 shows how Equation (1) 
transforms into the Bayesian net. The example refers to the 
threat assessment where 3 attack scenarios are analyzed 
and for each scenario 3 types of consequences are taken 
into consideration. 
 
Figure 9: Bayesian net for assessing terrorist threats 
(example) 
On Figure 10 the expanded view of the net shown on Figure 
9 is given. In this case not only the variables and their 
relationships are represented but also input values and the 
results. The final results (within the area marked with the red 




































 distributions. The distributions indicate the level of the 
uncertainty of the results. The input parameters determined 
by the historical data analysis are grouped in the upper area 
(i.e. above the final results), while the inputs determined by 
expert judgment are positioned in the lower area. 
 
Figure 10: Bayesian net for assessing terrorist threats - 















































Within the scope of the research the method for the 
quantitative assessment of terrorist threats was developed. It 
allows for combining the historical data and expert 
judgments and it's designed to be used by energy systems' 
operators in the electrical, gas and oil sectors. 
The proposed method was applied in the pilot project aimed 
to improve protection strategies and plans for the oil storage 
and transport system. The system, which is a part of 
Croatian critical infrastructure, consists of terminals with a 
total storage capacity of approx. 1,7 x 106 m3and of approx. 
620 km long pipelines. The pilot project provided an 
opportunity to identify strengths and weaknesses of the 
method. Gathered experience should provide the basis for 
further improvements. 
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